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In recent decades  managerial discourse and actual business practice has paid increasing attention to 
ethics. What was chiefly an academic discussion about business ethics has grown into a virtual 
'ethics industry' (Hyatt, 2005), and has been supplanted by a growing focus on corporate social 
responsibility and a booming consumer demand for ethical or 'fair' goods. Critical observers, myself 
included, have tended to dismiss this focus on ethics as little more than a cynical response to the 
new demands put forth by a more networked and better informed public opinion. Together with the 
managerial promotion of ideals like 'creativity' or 'self-actualization', such 'ethics-talk' has been read 
as part of a New Spirit of Capitalism, in which the critique put forth by the social movements of the 
Sixties and Seventies has been incorporated and transformed into a new way of legitimizing the 
same old forms of exploitation and  capital accumulation (Boltanski & Chiapello, 1999). In this 
short piece I would like to try out a different approach. I will suggest, quite provocatively, that the 
managerial focus on ethics is more than just a cynical move. Nor is it merely a matter of 
benevolence. Rather, it reflects an important structural transformation within the information 
society: the growth of a number of strategically central, albeit quantitatively marginal productive 
practices: all working according to a logic where value is related to the quality of social relations, 
and not to the quantity of productive time, or as Marxists would say, socially necessary labor time. 
These diverse practices, which I collectively refer to as 'the ethical economy',  are located within the 
boundaries of the corporate world, as in the case of new forms of knowledge work. But they also 
transpire outside of, or even in opposition to corporate capitalism, as in the case of more purist 
forms of Free Software. These processes are generally located at the top end of contemporary value 
chains and they have all to do with the production or manipulation of information and affect, like 
experiences, events and brand image. As such they have all been significantly empowered by the 
spread of networked information and communication technologies. The traversal nature of this 
ethical economy means that it is likely that its further growth and consolidation will quite radically 
redraw the boundaries of capitalist economy and redefine the field of conflict and compromise on 
which it evolves. (This is already visible in intensifying struggles over intellectual property and the 
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emergence of powerful hybrid forms like the social entrepreneurship movement, cf. Boyle, 2008.) 
The fact that the ethical economy is closely linked  to information technology, or, more precisely, 
that it emerges out of the extended forms of cooperation that these technologies enable,  implies that 
the ethical economy is likely to be central to the emerging economic ecology of the information 
society. The ethical economy might even become hegemonic to that ecology. Will value in the 
information society be conceived of as organized around ethics, just as it was conceived of as 
organized around labor in industrial society? That would amount to nothing less than a mutation in 
the socially dominant value form, a rare and radical kind of social transformation which has, 
nevertheless, occurred before (as when 'labor' and 'self-interest' emerged as central forms of value 
and motivation out of the tumultuous transformations of the European 17th century (Hirschman, 
1977, Linebaugh & Rediker, 2000). 
Why Ethical Economy?
The notion of an 'ethical economy' is immediately provocative. After all, ever since Artistotle, ethics 
and economics have been understood to belong to different spheres (the polis and the oikos, 
respectively) and to build on incommensurable logics. Economics is about the production of 
material necessities and the accumulation of private gain, ethics is about the civil coexistence of 
free men in the polis. When necessary the former most be invoked to contain the latter, as in the 
Aristotelian notion of 'just price'. A similar perspective has been prevalent in the tradition of 
business ethics. There ethics has generally been conceived as the justifiable limitations that must be 
put on business practice in the interest of the common good (Rodin, 2005). My use of the term 
'ethical economy' builds on a different idea: that ethics is not to be conceived as an extrinsic 
limitation to economic pursuits but, on the contrary, as an intrinsic source of economic value. This 
requires a different understanding of ethics. To most of the tradition of business ethics, as well as to 
modern (post-Kantian, or even post-Augustinian) discussions of ethics more generally, ethics has 
been taken to mean something like 'the elaboration of general roles for moral action'. More recently 
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such formalistic theories of ethics have been challenged by more 'post-modernist' approaches like 
those of Alain Badiou , Imanuel Levinas, Judith Butler, and, long before postmodernism, Michail 
Bahktin (cf. Bauman, 1993). Common to these authors is a rejection of universal ethical rules in 
favor of an approach that conceives of ethics as the practice of creating values and norms of action 
(a nomos) that is particular to the specific situation at hand. To put it in the words of Gabriela 
Coleman, who applies Bahktin's theory of ethics to Free/Open Source Software production, “the 
hard labor of ethics, its demanding phenomenology, is an outgrowth of taking risks, putting in the  
effort to engage with others and choosing to confront the situation at hand in its specificity” 
(Coleman, 2005:60). In this version, ethics is less about the elaboration of universal moral laws 
(such as the Kantian imperative) and more about creating the values and norms that keep a 
particular web of social relations together. Ethics is about producing however transitory forms of 
communion. Curiously, such 'postmodern' definitions of ethics come very close to what Aristotle 
had in mind. For him, ethics- conceived, importantly, as a craft, rather than as a science- was about 
the construction of community through the mutual balancing of affects and passions (ethoi). In their 
free interaction as ethical beings, the citizens construct the kinds of social relations that make the 
good life (eudaimonia) attainable within the polis. Ethics in this sense of the balancing of affect and 
the construction of relations is the very foundation of the political project of constructing a thing in 
common.
Where is the Ethical Economy?
We can see the emergence of precisely this Aristotelian notion of ethics as the fundamental value-
creating practice in a number of central contemporary business developments. Corporate social 
responsibility, a field that is rapidly moving from a marginal add-on to a central business practice, 
has evolved from a matter of 'doing good', or ensuring that business practice confirms to universal 
standards of proper conduct, to a matter of balancing the interest of a multitude of stakeholder 
groups, and actively managing the relations that confer value on the company. CSR in this sense is 
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about extracting value from the relations that constitute increasingly open and networked companies 
(Vogel, 2005). Marketing has seen a similar development. It has evolved from the 'scientific 
salesmanship' of the 1930s to a discipline that actively seeks to install and cultivate productive 
relations with consumers and other stakeholder groups. This is most visible in contemporary 
developments like 'customer co-production' or ' relationship marketing, where value depends on the 
ability to 'unlock the productive potential of relationships' (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004:10, cf. 
Zwick et al. 2008).  Similarly, contemporary forms of knowledge work, whether this be the high 
paid work of managers or the low paid work of the growing service 'precariat', tends to confirm to 
the model of immaterial labor, put forth by Maurizio Lazzarato (1997) and his colleagues. There, as 
Lazzarato emphasizes, what really creates value is the ability on the part of workers to create and 
maintain social relations, whether this be the temporary relations that enable the project team to 
function, or the affective relations that make possible a positive service experience.i Indeed, 
Lazzarato goes as far as to suggest that in immaterial labor “the production of value tends to 
coincide with the production of ethicity (eticità)” (1997:13). Finally, this confluence of ethics and 
value is visible in a host of 'anti capitalist',  oppositional, or hybrid practices, like the rapidly 
growing Free Software movement, new Open Design communities and social entrepreneurship and 
other forms of bottom up social production (like the urban agriculture movement, Carson, 2008). 
It is significant that Coleman uses Bahktin's Aristotelian notion of ethics to describe productive 
practice in the community of Debian developers, and that she calls it 'ethical labor' (an expression 
that would have made Hannah Arendt cringe!). In her description it is such ethical labor, rather than 
programming labor that is the most important source of  value in the Debian community. 
Programming is abundant; contrary to Microsoft, Debian does not need to pay people to program, 
on the contrary the community needs to devise complicated entry rituals to keep potential 
programmers out. What is scarce is the ability to build and maintain the complicated web of 
relations that keeps Debian functioning as a productive community and that maintains the ability of 
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the Debian brand to keep attracting vast supplies of free programming labor. Conversely, along with 
technical brilliance, it is the hard 'ethical labor' of building community that ultimately confers on 
participants the charisma and reputation in which their relative value is manifested. This picture is 
not too different from the ways in which management scholars have described work in networked, 
knowledge intensive 'post-bureaucratic' organizations (Maravelias,2003). Indeed, a wide and quite 
disparate literature on Free/Open Software (Coleman, 2005, O'Neil, 2009), Social , Open or User-
led Innovation (von Hipple, 2006), web 2.0 (Benkler, 2007),  brand management and viral 
marketing (Arvidsson, 2006); knowledge work and creativity (du Gay, 2007,  Arvidsson, 2007) 
suggest similar findings. In advanced contemporary productive practices, ethics and economic value 
seem to coincide. 
General Intellect
Why is this the case? All of the productive instances listed above rely mainly on abundant or 
'common' (Dyer-Withford, 2005) resources. The creation of trust and social capital deploy common 
affective and communicative skills. The same thing goes for self-organization and creativity. 
Customer co-production schemes are about appropriating the common knowledge of consumers. 
Web 2.0 participation requires that are common to one's group of peers, and access to a networked 
computer, which is fairly 'common'- in the sense that 1.5 billion people have such access. FLOSS or 
Open design participation requires more sophisticated skills which are nevertheless common to 
particular communities of practice. Indeed one of the most prevalent reasons for participating in F/
OSS initiative is the ability to absorb this common knowledge through a collective learning process, 
O'Neil, 2009. In other words,the most important productive resources deployed by social production 
are skills and competences that are commonly available and highly socialized, what Marx, in a 
famous and much quoted passage in the Grundrisse, called General Intellect (Marx, 
1973[1939]:705-709). Marx said two important things about General Intellect. First, that this is a 
common resource, freely available to  workers through their membership in a productive context; 
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their status as social (on our case, 'networked') individuals. Second, that to the extent that the 
capitalist production process becomes more complex- as it has with the onset of globalization and 
the hyper-networking that mark the information economy- the importance of such General Intellect 
would dwarf that of labor time as a source of wealth.ii But since General Intellect is common, and 
hence abundant, it cannot, by definition, constitute a basis for value. Hence Marx concludes that the 
massive importance of General Intellect as a source of wealth will ultimately explode the 'labor 
theory of value' on which the capitalist economy  builds, and propel us directly into communism , 
where the most important productive resource would remain 'beyond value' (Negri, 1999). What 
Marx did not foresee was that the very expansion and complexity of the productive process that 
have promoted this  new importance of General Intellect also create the conditions for a new 
standard of value. When production is hyper-complex and networked, and builds on commonly 
available resources, the scarce element becomes the ability to coordinate such complex and mobile 
processes in real time in ways that ensure the successful appropriation and utilization of General 
Intellect. Economic value becomes contingent on the ability to build, however transient social 
values and norms that are able to coordinate particular and situated productive processes. The 
creation of value comes to depend on the ability to construct the temporary, particular and situated 
nomos that allows a flexible and complex productive process to go on. In other words, value 
becomes contingent on ethical practice. 
The value of ethics resides in its ability to construct however temporary forms of order in complex 
productive networks. This is particularly relevant in situations with abundant recourse to common 
resources and 'free labor', or forms of labor that are difficult to command, like the 'creativity' of 
employees. Since such resources are ‘free’ in the double sense of being unpaid and being beyond 
command, they render the two classic forms of capitalist coordination, identified already by Coase 
(1937), market and contract, insufficient. Here the value of ethics takes two important forms: One, 
'the right kind of ethics' confers order and direction on productive cooperation, it creates the kind of 
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trust and social capital, which facilitates cooperation in complex networks. Two, 'the right kind of 
ethics' is able to attract externalities that are difficult both to command or remunerate (like customer 
input to Open Innovation systems, or programmer labor in Free Software).
General Sentiment 
These two problematics- how to organize extended and complex productive networks that build in 
part on 'free labor' , and how to legitimately appropriate common resources- are also central fields 
of struggle in contemporary capitalism. As such they have given rise to a number of attempts to 
subsume the ethical economy under an established value logic. One example of such attempts are 
the corporate promotion of forms of subjectivity and life projects that 'package' productivity  in 
market-ready formats like 'creativity' or 'entrepreneurship' (Abercrombie, 1991) or that seek to build 
the kinds of cultural ‘values’ that can attract economic value from the social (as in the case of brand 
management, Arvidsson, 2006). Another example is the expansion of the range and scope of 
intellectual property rights. All of these fields are ripe with struggles and conflict, and they have 
been amply discussed elsewhere (Boyle, 2008 du Gay, 2007). I would like to focus on a different 
aspect that is more rarely discussed yet in rapid evolution: the unresolved issues of how to measure 
this new value form. 
Concomitant with Marx's observations, contemporary capitalism is faced with a  growing value 
crisis. (And we can view neoliberalism as  an attempt to bracket that crisis by elevating to dogma 
the central dictum of neo-classical economics: that there are no values, only prices.) This value 
crisis is visible, among many things, in the rapidly growing share of intangibles to company 
valuation. Intangibles are per definition resources that fall outside of  established accounting 
standards. This does of course not mean that there are no attempts to measure such intangible 
efforts. On the contrary there is a whole measurement industry that proposes more or less realistic 
models for the estimation of things like brand value or intellectual capital.  Just like existing 
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attempts to measure the productivity of service work, educational efforts or other forms of 
immaterial labor- begining perhaps with the TQM movement in the 1980s- there efforts depart from 
an established, 'taylorist' (De Angelis, 2007), or 'disciplinary' paradigm of measurement, where 
'value' is defined according to adherence to centrally defined standards or benchmarks.  In other 
words, the quality of relations that is the source of value in these practices or assets, whether it be 
the quality of a service encounter or the quality of relations between a brand and its stakeholders, 
are measured in ways that are similar to the practices that have evolved around the measurement of 
value in terms of labor time. At the same time however, a radically different way of conceiving of 
(and eventually measuring) value is emerging. At a first level this new value form is visible in the 
proliferation of reputation economies; in self-branding as a key to managerial careers and in a host 
of other instances of what  Eva Illouz calls 'emotional capitalism' (Illouz, 2007,Hearn, 2008). 
Common to these instances is that value is not related to centralized standards, but to the ability to 
attract positive affect from one's peers or from members of the public at large. Taking inspiration 
from Gabriel Tarde's (1902) pioneering work we could say that, just like value is produced by 
accumulating General Intellect, it is estimated through accumulations of General Sentiment. This 
new value form is taking its first steps towards objectification in the proliferation of ratings and 
reviewing in e-commerce; in the success of social media like facebook or twitter that in some sense 
objectify one's 'ethical value', or at least the number of ones friends together with some aspects of 
the quality of one's interaction with them (visible in the activity level of one's profile, for example), 
as well as in the growing use of bottom-up tagging systems,or 'folksonomies' as ways to evaluate 
the utility of information, starting, albeit imperfectly, with Google itself.iii  There are already start-
up companies who are trying to synthesize this multitude of peer-judgments into general ethical or 
'trust' indexes. Very likely the transition to mobile platforms and the proliferation of RFID tags or 
other aspects of the coming 'internet of things', will radically facilitate this practice. Such peer-
based forms of measurement bring on two important novelties. First, that they are peer based, that is 
value is not conferred by one central gaze, as in the disciplinary regime of industrial society, but by 
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a multitude of glances.iv This implies a radical democratization of the (Nietzchian) ability to decide 
what the values should be. This fits nicely with the socialization of the ability to produce value that 
constitutes an important structural tendency in the General Intellect-based information society. 
While this will most probably have a long range of unpleasant consequences (imagine its 
implementation within corporate bureaucracies, for example), it does open up for the possibility for 
a rather radical democratization of the economy. This is particularly likely if such peer-based 
measurements can be tied to the valuation of financial assets. Imagine for example that as I swipe 
my cell phone over a branded sweater in the store I get access to a number that synthesizes the 
ratings of the ethical impact of that brand on the part of a multitude of actors placed all along the 
value chain, including perhaps the Thai seamstresses that have actually produced the sweater. Then 
imagine that that ethical index not only affects my willingness to purchase the sweater, but that 
investors will treat it as a reliable estimate of the intangible value of the brand, much like they treat 
Interbrand's much less realistic measurements today. 
Second, the proliferation of the peer based estimation of one's overall social impact as the main 
form of value would institutionalize a radically different motivational structure all across the social 
fabric. In his analysis of protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber makes the 
fascinating argument that while the first generation of protestant entrepreneurs worked hard for the 
love of God, the second or third generation worked even harder simply because they had to. The 
values of continuous accumulation had been socially institutionalized in the new iron cage of 
capitalism. That iron cage was the tangible result of a host of institutional developments, the most 
important being the capillary diffusion of money in a social fabric that up until the 18th century had 
remained predominately untouched by that medium (Braudel, 1985). As Georg Simmel (1978 
[1907]) subsequently observed, the spread of money helped to institutionalize a new value structure 
where individual self interest and a calculating attitude came to prevail. Seen form this perspective, 
it is not unlikely that the capillary diffusion of some form of medium of ethical value will 
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institutionalize a different overall motivational pattern: the drive to expand the reach and quality of 
one's social impact. 
This is of course speculation, it is unlikely that ratings will save the world, or that technoligy will 
propel us directly into something akin to the Whuffie-based reality of Cory Doctorw’s (2003) 
famous novel. However, there are two major reasons to believe  that it is likely that some form of 
objectification of General Sentiment will grow in importance as a medium of value, and that it will 
acquire some influence on how financial markets work. First, because the measurement industry is 
growing, and there is a distinct demand for a rational system for the evaluation of intangible assets. 
The first company to build a system that is based on how those assets are actually evaluated by the 
people that consume and produce them is likely to make a killing! Second, because the proliferation 
of networked Ict:s  is also the socialization of the means of social organization: This means that 
bottom up social technologies, among them new media of value are more likely to emerge (this is 
already visible in the massive expansion of alternative currencies, Lietaer. 2001). In other words, 
people have an unprecedented power to organize economic flows from the bottom up. Is it possible 
to imagine that one major field of resistance to the capitalist subsumption of the ethical economy 
will be the popular imposition of a new logic of value? Could such a perspective cast a different 
light on diffuse phenomena like ethical consumerism, growing online social activism, and the surge 
of social entrepreneurs? 
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